November 2026

At last, we have a government showing some common sense about a major infrastructure project before it becomes another multi-billion-dollar disaster.

The Queensland Government has suspended key contracting work on the proposed $18.4 billion Borumba pumped hydro project, amid growing concerns that it could become another Snowy 2.0 – with massive cost blowouts, lengthy delays and taxpayers left paying the bills.

And the evidence suggests the Government has every reason to be worried.

According to an article by RenewEconomy, Queensland Hydro has halted procurement for exploratory tunnelling, drilling and earthworks on the massive energy storage project west of the Sunshine Coast.

The project, originally proposed by the former Labor State Government, was intended to provide electricity storage capacity supporting the state’s transition towards renewable energy.

But, like so many grand infrastructure schemes announced by politicians, the original promises are unravelling.

The projected cost has already increased by around $4 billion to $18.4 billion, while the project is three years behind schedule.

And now serious questions are being raised about whether it should proceed at all.

The Australian reports that Professor Andrew Blakers, a renewable energy expert from Australian National University, believes Borumba is a fundamentally poor choice of location.

Blakers, whose research helped identify potential pumped hydro locations, says Borumba is expensive, inefficient and should be abandoned in favour of better alternatives.

The numbers are extraordinary.

Blakers says Snowy 2.0, despite its notorious cost blowouts, has a construction cost of between $63 and $71 per kilowatt hour of energy storage capacity.

Borumba’s equivalent cost is estimated at $383.

That’s more than five times as expensive.

And when your project makes Snowy 2.0 look comparatively economical, you know you’ve got a serious problem.

We’ve written repeatedly about the extraordinary mismanagement of Snowy 2.0. Originally promoted with a $2 billion price tag, its projected cost has now reached between $22 billion and $25 billion, with completion pushed out to 2029.

That’s an increase of more than tenfold.

It’s one of the greatest infrastructure management failures in Australia’s history.

Now Queensland is facing the possibility of creating its own version of this financial catastrophe.

The former Labor Government also proposed the enormous Pioneer-Burdekin pumped hydro project, which the incoming Crisafulli Government cancelled after discovering estimates suggesting costs could reach $36.8 billion.

That’s another extraordinary example of politicians making ambitious announcements without adequately establishing what their promises will actually cost.

Borumba presents environmental concerns as well.

According to McKenna’s report, project assessments identified potential impacts on 21 threatened or endangered species and the loss of extensive areas of forest.

So the proposition was spending $18.4 billion on a project that independent experts say offers poor value for money, while also creating substantial environmental damage.

Queensland Treasurer and Energy Minister David Janetzki says the Government is awaiting a commercial assessment before deciding whether to proceed. That assessment is now expected in February 2027.

This is precisely what governments should be doing before committing enormous amounts of taxpayers’ money.

Of course, Queensland needs reliable electricity infrastructure and energy storage as demand grows. But there is a vast difference between recognising that need and blindly proceeding with a poorly designed, excessively expensive project.

Governments should be assessing alternatives, demanding rigorous business cases and ensuring that projected benefits justify the expenditure.

Too often in Australia, politicians announce massive infrastructure developments for political advantage, then leave taxpayers to deal with the financial consequences.

The Queensland Government deserves credit for questioning Borumba before the spending becomes irreversible.

The lesson from Snowy 2.0 should be obvious: it’s much cheaper to stop a potentially disastrous project before construction than to discover years later that the original budget was a fantasy.

Taxpayers need more governments prepared to apply that lesson.